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PROTECTING OUR COASTAL INTERESTS: A POLICY 
PROPOSAL FOR COORDINATING COASTAL ZONE 
MANAGEMENT, NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND THE 
FEDERAL SUPREMACY DOCTRINE 
By 
Richard Lee Kuersteiner* 
Paul M. Sullivan * * 
David Block Temin*** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
No other region in our country is subject to so many urgent de-
mands from powerful conflicting interests as the coastal area. More 
than 50 percent of the population of the United States currently 
lives within fifty miles of the ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, or the 
Great Lakes; it is estimated that by the year 2000, 80 percent of 
our population will inhabit those areas. 1 In addition to the residen-
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tial development made necessary by this rapid population growth, 
other pressures for development and utilization come from eco-
nomic and political interests on behalf of energy production, com-
mercial fishing, continental shelf mining, recreation, and shipping. 
Conservationist and preservationist forces advocate equally vigor-
ous countermeasures to limit development efforts. The federal gov-
ernment also has a dual interest in the coastal area; it not only 
serves as arbitrator among competing non-federal claimants for 
coastal area control, but is itself a proprietor of coastal property 
and a primary user of coastal resources. Recognizing the national 
significance and unique problems of balancing these interests in 
the coastal zone, Congress passed the Coastal Zone Management 
Act of 1972 (CZMA).I This Act, as will be reviewed below, estab-
lishes a complex system of federal-state interaction for planning 
and management of the nation's coastal resources. 
The complexity of regulating the varied and competing interests 
in the coastal zone is compounded further by the concept of fed-
eral supremacy.8 Certain of these interests clearly are governed by 
supremacy principles while others are much more amenable to 
state regulation. A prime example of an important coastal interest 
governed by federal supremacy doctrine is national defense. Obvi-
ously, many defense related activities and the siting of defense in-
stallations must take place within the coastal zone. The very na-
ture of the majority of Navy and Coast Guard activities requires a 
coastal location. The coastline is also the site for a significant por-
tion of Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and NASA programs. 
It is the thesis of this article, however, that no clear standard has 
emerged from the CZMA which adequately defines the weight to 
be given to national defense in balancing coastal zone interests and 
is at the same time consistent with the federal supremacy doctrine. 
Consequently, state coastal zone management programs generally 
offer no pragmatic guidelines for distinguishing between interests 
which are subject to federal supremacy and those which are not. 
The absence of such guidance, or at least unambiguous procedures 
for carrying out such balancing, has lead to conflicting and often 
inadequate consideration of the national defense interests in state 
AD. NEWS 4777. 
• 16 u.s.c. §§ 1451-1464 (Supp. v, 1975); P.L. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1281, signed by the Presi-
dent October 27, 1972; Amended P.L. 94-370,90 Stat. 1013 July 26, 1976; P.L. 95-372, 92 
Stat. 630 September 18, 1978. 
• See section II, E infra. 
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and local coastal zone management programs. 
In our opinion the CZMA does provide the framework for a pol-
icy that will balance national defense and other vital national in-
terests in a manner that is both consistent with federal supremacy 
doctrine and compatible with the CZMA's goal of state coordina-
tion of coastal management. What is needed, however, is a coher-
ent and uniform policy that provides greater deference to federal 
agencies' views in the initial development of the state and local 
coastal programs. Additionally, such a policy should be flexible 
enough to accommodate the often rapid changes in federal agency 
activities, particularly those related to national defense, resulting 
from changes in national and international circumstances. 
This article will not attempt to examine comprehensively the 
substantive and procedural aspects of the CZMA or the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) regulations 
under which the Act is administered.4 Other commentators have 
done that proficiently. II Rather, the focus here will be on the con-
sideration of national interests and national security by the CZMA 
and its implementing regulations, the exclusion of federal lands 
from the coastal zone, and federal supremacy. This article will also 
examine the often problematic manner in which state and local 
coastal management programs have dealt with national security. 
Finally, policy recommendations will be made for dealing with the 
complicated and crucial problem of balancing interests in the 
coastal zone. 
II. PROBLEMATIC ISSUES UNDER THE CZMA AND NOAA 
REGULATIONS 
A. General Framework of Federal-State Interaction 
The CZMA enumerates a number of competing interests and na-
tional goals in the coastal zone and fosters, through the incentives 
of federal grants and federal agency cooperation, the establishment 
of a system of individual state and local management programs.6 
• 15 C.F.R. §§ 920-920.61 (1979). 
• See Schoenbaum & Parker, Federalism in the Coastal Zone: Three Models of State 
Jurisdiction, 57 N.C. L. REV. 231 (1979); Finnell, The Federal Regulatory Role in Coastal 
Land Management, AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 169 (1978); Zile, A Legislative-Politi-
cal History of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 1 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 
235 (1974). 
• See S. REP. No. 92-753, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in (1972) U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 4776. 
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These state and local programs comprehensively plan for and man-
age coastal resources in coordination with the federal government. 
Primary responsibility for administering and approving this inter-
governmental system lies with the Secretary of Commerce and the 
Secretary's designee, the Associate Administrator for Coastal Zone 
Management of NOAA.7 The Act envisions the development of 
state management programs with federal financial assistance, fol-
lowed by NOAA approval of these programs.8 States with approved 
programs may participate in further federal grants,' and may, 
through the Act's consistency provisions, play an important part in 
federal agency decision making. 
Federal agencies conducting activities within, or with impacts 
upon, the coastal zone are assigned specific responsibilities under 
the CZMA. The basic statutory language defining federal agency 
obligations sets forth four separate requirements.lo First, all fed-
eral agencies "conducting or supporting activities directly affecting 
the coastal zone" shall carry out such activities "to the maximum 
extent practicable, consistent with approved state management 
programs."ll The term "directly affecting" is presently undefined 
by the Act and NOAA regulations. Second, federal agencies under-
taking development projects in the coastal zone must insure that 
such projects are consistent "to the maximum extent practicable" 
with the approved state management program. II Third, in issuing a 
federal license, permit, or lease to conduct an activity affecting 
land or water uses in the coastal zonel8 or in the outer continental 
shelf,14 the granting agency must await certification by the state of 
the consistency of the proposed license, permit, or lease with the 
state management program or a variance determination by the 
Secretary of Commerce. III Fourth, federal agencies may not grant 
7 See 15 C.F.R. § 923.2(b) (1979). 
• See 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1453-1454 (West Supp. 1979); 15 C.F.R. § 923.2 (1979). 
• 16 U.S.C.A. § 1455 (West Supp. 1979). 
10 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456 (West Supp. 1979). 
11 1d. NOAA regulations currently define "consistency to the maximum extent practica-
ble" to mean full consistency with the state management program except as prohibited by 
existing law applicable to the federal agency, or unless unforseen circumstances arise. 15 
C.F.R. § 930.32 (1979). 
,. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(2) (West Supp. 1979). 
II 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1979). 
,. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1979). 
I. An applicant for a federal license, permit, or lease to conduct any activity a1fecting 
land or water uses in the coastal zone must certify to a NOAA approved state management 
agency that the activity will be consistent with the state program. The federal agency which 
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assistance to state and local agencies for coastal projects that have 
not been approved by the state coastal management agency unless 
the Secretary of Commerce finds that the project is consistent with 
the purposes of the CZMA or "necessary in the interest of national 
security. "Ie 
Another section of the Act provides that nothing in the CZMA 
shall be construed "to diminish either federal or state jurisdiction, 
responsibility, or rights in the field of planning, development, or 
control of water resources, submerged lands, or navigable wa-
ters."17 This section also states that the Act does not modify or 
repeal existing laws applicable to federal agencies. In addition, the 
CZMA does not affect any obligations of federal agencies under the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act or the Clean Air Act.le Thus, 
while not relieved of responsibility or obligations under other laws, 
federal agencies are subject to consistency requirements in activi-
ties directly affecting the coastal zone, in development projects in 
the coastal zone, and in the granting of licenses, permits, leases, or 
assistance. II 
Implementation of the statutory scheme of the CZMA is en-
trusted to the Secretary of Commerce, whose authority has been 
largely delegated to the Assistant Administrator for Coastal Zone 
Management of NOAA.IO The Secretary or the Secretary's designee 
is to grant the license, permit, or lease may not do so until the state has concurred with the 
applicant's certification or the Secretary of Commerce has concluded that the activity is 
consistent with the objectives of the CZMA or is "otherwise necessary in the interest of 
national security." See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1979). Although federal 
agencies which must obtain permits for their activities from another federal agency are not, 
themselves, considered "applicants" for federal licenses or permits for purposes of this sec-
tion, private contractors working for those agencies would be subject to this provision. See 
15 C.F.R. § 930.52 (1979). See also Schoenbaum & Parker, supra note 5, at 246. 
II 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(d) (West Supp. 1979). 
If 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(e) (West Supp. 1979). 
II 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(0; Clean Air Act, see 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (West Supp. 1979); 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, see 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V, 1975). I. See also Brewer, Federal Consistency and State Expectations, 2 COASTAL ZONE MAN-
AGBMENT J. 315, 318-20 (1976); Schoenbaum & Parker, supra note 5, at 238-53 . 
.. The Secretary of Commerce, or the Secretary's representative in NOAA's Office of 
Coastal Zone Management (OCZM), acts somewhat as an intermediary between the federal 
agencies and the states. The CZMA gives the Secretary extensive approval, oversight, and 
mediatory responsibilities. Most importantly, the Secretary approves all state management 
programs. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1454(h) (West Supp. 1979). In so doing the Secretary must make 
lure that the state has complied with the requirements of the CZMA in developing its plan. 
Much of this is tied to the power to make administrative grants to the states. See 16 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1454-1455 (West Supp. 1979). Additionally, the Secretary is required to "con-
sult with, cooperate with, and to the maximum extent practicable, coordinate his activities 
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may not grant approval of a state program (and thereby trigger the 
federal consistency requirements mentioned above) unless the 
Secretary finds that the program has been developed "with the op-
portunity of full participation by relevant Federal agencies"21 or 
"unless the views of Federal agencies principally affected by such 
program have been adequately considered."22 NOAA's implement-
ing regulations attempt to clarify the concept of "full participa-
tion" and "adequate consideration" of federal agency views. One 
such regulation identifies a number of federal agencies as being 
"relevant" to each state program and calls for contact between 
those federal agencies and the state.23 Another section of the regu-
lations provides for incorporation of federal agency input by the 
state during the development of the management program.24 Thus 
with other interested Federal agencies." 16 V.S.C.A. § 1456(a). Finally, the Secretary of 
Commerce is given responsibility for mediating disputes between the federal agencies and 
the states. 16 V.S.C.A. § 1456(h). See also S. REP., supra note I, at (1972) V.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 4790, 4792. 
11 16 V.S.C.A. § 1455(c)(l) (West Supp. 1979) . 
•• 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(b) (West Supp. 1979) . 
• s 15 C.F.R. § 925 requires that each "relevant" federal agency be contacted by the state 
agency preparing the program, and that the federal agency advise the state agency "as to 
procedures to be followed in dealing with the Federal agency in relation to the development 
of the state program; and the state agencies shall comply with these procedures." 15 C.F.R. 
§ 925.3(b) (1979). The regulation requires that the federal and state agencies maintain such 
relationships and communications during the development of the state program "as will 
enable each to be fully informed of the other's views in relation to the program as it is 
developed." 15 C.F.R. § 925.4 (1979). 
If 15 C.F.R. § 923.51 specifically requires that the state agency contact each relevant fed-
eral agency, provide for federal agency input on a timely basis as the program is developed, 
maintain records of these contacts, and evaluate federal comments. When the state finds it 
appropriate it should "accommodate the substance of relevant comments in the manage-
ment program" and indicate the nature of major comments by federal agencies, discussing 
any major differences or conflicts between the management program proposals and the fed-
eral views. 15 C.F.R. § 923.51(b)(4) (1979). Furthermore, states are required to consider and 
evaluate federal agency comments on management of coastal resources (including state-
ments of national interest policies or claims related thereto), statements of national inter-
ests in the planning for or siting of facilities which are more than local in nature, uses which 
are subject to the management program, areas which are of particular concern to the man-
agement program, and federally developed or assisted plans that must be coordinated with 
the management program pursuant to the CZMA. 15 C.F.R. § 923.51(c) (1979). It is further 
provided that the Assistant Administrator "shall determine whether the State consideration 
of relevant Federal agency views during the program development has been adequate, based 
on the nature and reasonableness of a State's evaluation of and response to relevant Federal 
agency views that relate to substantive requirements of the Act, in particular those relating 
to boundaries, uses subject to management, areas of particular concern, legal authorities, 
guidelines on priorities of uses, organization, shore front planning process, energy facility 
planning process, the erosion planning process, and national interest considerations." 15 
C.F.R. § 923.51(e) (1979). 
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the general framework of the CZMA and its implementing regula-
tions call for a detailed system of division of responsibility as well 
as close cooperation between federal and state agencies. 
B. National Interests 
In addition to providing a federal-state division of responsibili-
ties, the CZMA also envisions a distinction between "national" and 
"local" interests in the coastal zone. A primary goal of the CZMA 
is to assist the states in developing unified regional (including in-
terstate regions and regions within a state) and state policies "for 
dealing with land and water use decisions of more than local signif-
icance. "III Such policy should promote uniformity of policy within 
large geographical areas as well as uniformity in consideration of 
state-wide and national interests. Yet, although it clearly assumes 
that there is a separate "national interest" in the coastal zone, the 
CZMA does not define precisely what that in~rest is. The legisla-
tive history, however, indicates that some uses of the coastal zone, 
such as navigation and military activities, are solely federal respon-
sibilities, while other uses, such as economic development, recrea-
tion, and conservation are concerns of both the federal government 
and the states. Ie But as the following discussion suggests, there is 
little in NOAA regulations that aids in applying such a distinction 
or defines the areas in which states must yield to "solely" federal 
responsibilities. 
The state must provide in its program for adequate considera-
tion of the national interests involved in "planning for, and in the 
siting of facilities . . . which are necessary to meet requirements 
which are other than local in nature. "17 This includes identifying 
the state's coastal zone boundaries under the management pro-
graml8 and providing definitions of permissible land uses. Ie The 
II 16 U.S.C.A. § 1451(h) (West Supp. 1979). 
H S. REP., supra note 1, at [1972] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4778 . 
.., 16 U.S.C.A. § 1455(c)(8) (West Supp. 1979). 
H 16 U.S.C.A. § 1454(b)(l) (West Supp. 1979). 
II 16 U.S.C.A. § 1454(b)(2) (West Supp. 1979). The regulations also require states, in es-
tablishing permitted uses, to "be cognizant of the requirements in subsection 306(c)(a) of 
the Act that the management program must provide 'for adequate consideration of the na-
tional interest in planning for, and the siting of, facilities (including energy facilities in, or 
which significantly affect, such states coastal zone) which are necessary to meet require-
ments which are other than local in nature.''' 15 C.F.R. § 920.12(b)(2) (1979). The regula-
tion goes on to state, however, only that "states must have sufficient processes for providing 
such consideration." Part 920 also sets forth preliminary program approval criteria. It is 
712 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS (Vol. 8:705 
Secretary of Commerce is responsible for ensuring that the state 
makes these considerations.80 
The NOAA regulations explain that the primary purpose of re-
quiring adequate consideration of national interests involved in the 
planning for and siting of facilities necessary to meet other than 
local requirements is "to assure that such facilities are considered 
in (1) the development of the State's management program, (2) the 
review and approval of the program by the Assistant Administra-
tor, and (3) the implementation of the program as such facilities 
are proposed."81 The regulations identify, among the sources which 
specify the national interests to be considered during program de-
velopment and implementation, the following: federal laws and leg-
islation; policy statements from the President; statements from 
federal agencies regarding national interests specifically related to 
a state's coastal zone; and plans, reports, and studies from federal, 
state, and interstate agencies or groups.32 
therein required that each state demonstrate that "adequate steps have been or are being 
taken to meet requirements under section 306 or 307 of the Act, which involve Federal 
officials or agencies." 15 C.F.R. § 920.42(a)(4) (1979). Although the regulation expands 
somewhat on this requirement, the expansion is also in the most general terms, with no 
specific reference to any definition of the national interest. The regulation provides: 
Pursuant to subsection 305(d)(2)(D) of the Act, la) Coastal State is eligible to receive 
grants under this subsection if it has ... It)aken or is taking adequate steps to meet any 
requirement under Section 306 or 307 which involves any Federal official or agency. For 
purposes of this paragraph, the particular sections of 306 and 307 are: (i) Subsection 
306(a)(I)-identification of excluded Federal lands; and (ii) Subsection 
306(c)(I)-opportunity for full participation by relevant Federal agencies. This shall in-
clude advising Federal agencies (especially at the regional level) of the State's intent to 
apply for preliminary approval; (iii) Subsection 306(c)(8)-adequate consideration of the 
national interest involved in planning for, and in the siting of, facilities necessary to 
meet requirements which are other than local in nature; (iv) Subsection 
307(c)-development of procedures for certifying Federal consistency with respect to 
Federal activities or development projects, and with respect to activities subject to Fed-
erallicenses or permits; (v) Subsection 307(d)-development of procedures for certifying 
Federal consistency with respect to Federal assistance to State and local governments; 
and (vi) Subsection 307(h)(I)-participation in mediation procedures, if appropriate. 15 
C.F.R. § 920.42(b)(v)(c)(4) . 
.. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1455(c)(8) (West Supp. 1979) . 
• , 15 C.F.R. § 923.52(a) (1979) . 
• , 15 C.F.R. § 923.52(g) (1979). States are advised, in considering the nature of natural 
interests associated with the planning for and siting of facilities that are more than local in 
nature, to "consult with Federal and other State agencies having responsibilities relating to 
these interests as well as with industries in other relevant entities to determine the potential 
demand for facilities in each State that are more than local in nature." 15 C.F.R. § 923.52(f) 
(1979). This regulation also advises the states to consult with federal and other state agen-
cies involved in resources conservation and protection, and to weigh, in considering the na-
tional interest involved in such facility siting, "the configuration and size of a State's coastal 
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In the NOAA regulations there is a tabular summary of coastal 
uses and associated facilities which may involve the national inter-
est in facilities planning or siting, and an identification of federal 
agencies which may be involved in such uses.33 State plans must 
describe which national interests in facility siting were considered 
during program development, the sources relied upon, an indica-
tion of how and where these considerations are reflected in the 
substance of the management program, and a description of a pro-
cess for continued consideration of identified national interests 
during program implementation.34 In addition, where appropriate, 
the plan must include "[an] indication of when and where national 
interests in identified facilities may compete or conflict with other 
national interests in coastal resource conservation. In cases of such 
conflict, the program shall indicate how the conflict has been or 
can be weighed and resolved. "311 
A final determination of the adequacy of a state plan's consider-
ation of the national interests rests with the Assistant Administra-
tor of NOAA.3s In reaching this determination, the Assistant Ad-
ministrator is required to "assess" the reasonableness of the claims 
of national interests made, the sources used to specify national in-
terests, the consideration given in the management program to 
these national interests (including the weighing of competing inter-
ests), the responses of the state to major siting concerns raised by 
federal agencies or others, and adequacy of the procedure set forth 
in the plan for continuing consideration of national interests after 
the program has been approved.37 
NOAA has broad discretion to define, through the program ap-
proval process, what constitutes adequate consideration of the na-
tional interests under a state management program.38 It might 
zone; the quantity, quality and distribution of various coastal resources; and the coastal-
dependent nature of those facilities." 
ss 15 C.F.R. § 923.52 (Table 1) (1979). The treatment of national defense in this table is 
superficial in the extreme. Under the heading "Uses" is listed "National defense and aero-
space"; the "Associated facilities" for such uses are "Military bases and installations; de-
fense manufacturing facilities; and aerospace facilities." "Associated Federal agencies" are 
listed as "Department of Defense, National Aeronautics and Space Administration." No 
other specific guidance is given . 
.. 15 C.F.R. § 923.52(b) (1979) . 
•• 15 C.F.R. § 923.52(b)(2) (1979) . 
.. 15 C.F.R. §§ 923.2, 923.72 (1979). 
87 15 C.F.R. § 923.53 (1979) . 
.. American Petroleum Institute v. Knecht, 609 F.2d 1306, 1313 (9th Cir. 1979) (uphold-
ing NOAA's approval of the California Coastal Management Program). 
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have been expected that NOAA would have set forth, in its pro-
gram approval regulations, its system or its priorities for balancing 
competing state and federal interests, and its expectations as to 
the manner in which states would conduct and demonstrate their 
own "consideration" of national interests. However, despite the de-
tail of the above regulations, they do little more than compel the 
states to seek and read the comments of federal agencies, and re-
quire the Assistant Administrator of NOAA to review the state's 
compliance with this limited "seek and read" process. 
As pointed out below, the federal supremacy doctrine is the Con-
stitutional foundation for resolving conflicts between state and fed-
erallaw, and nothing in the CZMA makes this doctrine inapplica-
ble to the program approval process under the CZMA. 
Nevertheless, the NOAA program approval regulations do not dis-
cuss this doctrine or its application to NOAA review of state pro-
grams. Indeed, while the supremacy doctrine generally accords pri-
ority to federal law, several of the NOAA regulations referred to 
above appear to encourage states to second -guess, or even oppose, 
federal agency proposals. No distinction is drawn in the NOAA 
regulations between those agency projects and activities mandated 
by other federal laws and those which are developed or imple-
mented at the discretion of the federal agency. Moreover, there is 
no standard provided in the NOAA regulations either for the 
states' determination of how competing or conflicting national in-
terests are to be weighed89 or for the assessment by the Adminis-
trator of the reasonableness of agency claims of national interests 
and a state's consideration of these national interests.4o A process 
of formal mediation is provided for the resolution of "serious dis-
agreements" between federal agencies and coastal states during the 
development or initial implementation of a management pro-
gram,41 but no standards are given by which these serious disagree-
ments can be resolved between the parties, short of formal media-
tion, on the basis of relatively specific guidelines which take 
federal supremacy into account and which can be applied by the 
disagreeing parties. 
Thus, little guidance is provided by which the federal agencies 
might anticipate the manner in which their opinions of the na-
•• See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 923.52(b)(2) (1979) . 
•• 15 C.F.R. § 923.52(i)(l) and (2) (1979) . 
• , 15 C.F.R. § 923.54 (1979). 
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tional interests are to be reviewed, by a state and by NOAA, or the 
standards against which these opinions are to be measured. Such a 
deficiency in the regulations practically ensures that disagreements 
of any substance between state and federal agencies will be re-
ferred individually to the mediation process, and prevents state 
and federal agencies from reaching informal agreement at the low-
est practicable levels of decision making through reasonable ap-
praisals of likely NOAA decisions. 
C. National Defense 
Although the CZMA is somewhat vague in defining the national 
interest, the Act's legislative history indicates that Congress 
viewed the national defense interest as being of major importance 
in the coastal zone.4S Nonetheless, the regulations so far published 
give little guidance or direction to states or federal agencies for 
considering issues of national defense and security, and provide lit-
tle or ambiguous insight into the standards to be employed by the 
Secretary or the Secretary's designee in balancing national security 
and defense against competing claims. The ambiguity of many of 
the provisions causes difficulty in precisely determining what the 
state's role in national security decisions should be under the 
CZMA.48 As will be shown below, in the absence of clear statutory 
or administrative guidance, this question must be evaluated under 
the general principles of the federal supremacy doctrine. 
The issue of national security is mentioned explicitly in the 
CZMA only in the context of variances for federal licensing and 
assistance." In making the variance decision the Secretary of Com-
merce is aided by the regulation's definition of "necessary in the 
interest of national security. lin The regulation, however, does not 
•• See generally S. REP., supra note I, at [1972] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4777 . 
•• See also Schoenbaum & Parker, supra note 5, at 249 . 
•• The most explicit role for the Secretary of Commerce with respect to national security 
is the granting of an exception to or variance from consistency obligations to applicants for 
federal licenses, permits, leases or assistance when appropriate "in the interest of national 
security," in spite of state objections. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1456(c)(3)(A), (c)(3)(B), and 1456(d) 
(West Supp. 1979). In making such a determination the Secretary of Commerce may be 
aided by, but is not bound by, the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. See S. REP., 
supra note I, at [1972] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4793; and 15 C.F.R. § 930.122' (1979). 
•• The term "necessary in the interest of national security" describes a Federal license or 
permit activity, or a Federal assistance activity which, although inconsistent with a 
State's management program, is found by the Secretary to be permissible because a na-
tional defense or other national security interest would be significantly impaired if the 
activity were not permitted to go forward as proposed. Secretarial review of national 
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define what a "national defense or other national security interest" 
is, in spite of the fact that not only the activities of the Depart-
ment of Defense, but also the activities of the Department of En-
ergy, Department of Transportation, National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, and Department of Interior are intimately 
related in many respects to national security. No guidelines are 
provided as to the extent to which principles of federal preemption 
or supremacy will be applied, or the extent to which congressional 
authorization of a program may foreclose an independent review, 
by the Secretary of Commerce, of national security necessity. 
In short, the NOAA regulations as a whole implement the statu-
tory requirements of the CZMA with respect to national defense 
and national security by repeating and restating the relevant statu-
tory language, rather than by adding clarity, detail, or interpreta-
tion. General guidance and statutory terms are repeated in a vari-
ety of contexts, but few definitions are provided, no standards are 
set forth, and little consideration is given to the extent to which 
Congress has already defined, in breadth and detail, the obliga-
tions of federal agencies or the scopes of their authorities. In such 
circumstances, state and federal agencies charged with responsibil-
ity, under the CZMA and applicable state law, for defining or con-
sidering national defense and national security in the development 
of state management programs, must treat each decision on an ad 
hoc basis. Any guidance from NOAA for setting standards to be 
applied in the field must be derived not from the regulations, but 
from observations of secretarial mediation, and from such prece-
dential value as may inhere in decisions of the Assistant Adminis-
trator of NOAA in the approval or disapproval of state manage-
ment programs. Such guidelines, as will be argued below, are both 
inadequate and inconsistent with other doctrines preserved in the 
CZMA. 
D. Excluded Lands 
The questions of how the national security determination is 
made and who should make it are affected significantly by the ex-
security issues shall be aided by information submitted by the Department of Defense or 
other interested Federal agencies. The views of such agencies, while not binding, shall be 
given considerable weight by the Secretary. The Secretary will seek information to deter-
mine whether the objected to activity directly supports national defense or other essen-
tial national security objectives. 
15 C.F.R. § 923.122 (1979). 
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cluded lands clause of the CZMA, which states, "[e]xcluded from 
the coastal zone are lands the use of which is by law subject solely 
to the discretion of or which is held in trust by the Federal Gov-
ernment, its officers or agents."·e The phrase "subject solely to the 
discretion of . . . the Federal Government" led to a major contro-
versy between certain federal agencies and the states. The agencies 
asserted that all lands owned by the United States were excluded 
from the coastal zone, while the states claimed that only land sub-
ject to "exclusive legislative jurisdiction"·7 was exempt.48 NOAA 
originally adopted the states' view and requested an opinion from 
the U.S. Attorney General clarifying the issue. The Attorney Gen-
eral concluded, through an analysis of the legislative history of the 
CZMA, that the federal agencies' interpretation was correct.n 
NOAA subsequently adopted this interpretation and extended its 
definition of excluded lands to include leased lands. Consistency 
determinations are now required only for those federal agencies' 
activities on excluded lands which have spillover effects onto non-
excluded lands.lIo 
The states have reluctantly adopted the Attorney General's in-
terpretation and are required to incorporate it into their manage-
ment programs.1I1 Some states, however, including California, re-
•• 16 U.S.C. § 1453(1) (Supp. v, 1975). For detailed analysis of the debate over this provi-
sion see Brewer, supra note 13, at 320; and Williamson, Federal Lands and Consistency: An 
Intergovernmental Planning Proposal for the Coastal Zone, 4 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT 
J. 435 (1978) . 
.. Legislative jurisdiction refers to the authority of a governmental entity to exercise leg-
islative control over an area. There are four categories of legislative jurisdiction under which 
the United States may hold land: exclusive, partial, concurrent, and proprietorial. Exclusive 
jurisdiction derives from Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution and creates a 
"Federal enclave" in which the states have ceded all legislative jurisdiction to the U.S .. 
Concurrent jurisdiction gives coequal authority to the state and the federal government. 
Partial jurisdiction exists when the state has ceded to the U.S. legislative jurisdiction in 
some areas but retained it in others. Under proprietorial jurisdiction the federal government 
has acquired some right of title to the land but has not been ceded any measure of the 
state's authority. U.S. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVlEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION's 
LAND; A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS; U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1970 . 
•• Letter from Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General, to William C. Brewer, Jr., 
General Council to NOAA (August 20, 1976) . 
•• Id. For legislative history on the excluded lands issue see S. REP., supra note I, at 
[1972) U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 4783; CONFERENCE REP. No. 92-1544, 92nd Cong., 2nd 
Sess. (1972) reprinted in [1972) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4823 . 
.. 15 C.F.R. § 923.33 (1979). Subparagraph (d) reminds the states that the CZMA "does 
not impair in any way any rights or authorities that it may have over federal lands that exist 
separate from this program." 
.. 15 C.F.R. § 923.33(c) (1979) requires that the states describe or map lands or types of 
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serve the right to include federally-owned or leased land "in the 
event judicial, legislative, or administrative modification should oc-
cur."51 In an attempt to induce such a judicial modification, the 
State of Washington has brought suit against the United States 
and the Department of Commerce challenging the NOAA defini-
tion of excluded lands and seeking a declaration that only lands 
subject to exclusive federal legislative jurisdiction are excluded 
from the coastal zone. 58 The state maintains that the current 
NOAA interpretation undermines the consistency provisions of the 
CZMA. This case is currently pending. 
The importance of the definition of excluded lands to national 
security activities in the coastal zone is fairly obvious. Since a large 
portion of Department of Defense and Coast Guard activities takes 
place on and affects only federally-owned land, the consistency 
provisions of the CZMA are not applicable to those actions. Sub-
ject to congressional requirements and oversight, the heads of the 
relevant agencies, rather than the Secretary of Commerce, make 
the final decisions in balancing other coastal interests with their 
national defense missions. By no means, however, does the ex-
cluded lands clause eliminate the federal agency's concern with re-
quirements of the CZMA. All activities taking place on, spilling 
over onto, or otherwise directly affecting non-excluded areas in the 
coastal zone come under the Act.54 Nevertheless, the excluded 
lands provision at least establishes a clear-cut rule that the appli-
cable federal agency will determine what the national defense in-
terest is on those excluded lands. 
E. Federal Supremacy 
A full understanding of the Attorney General's opinion on ex-
cluded lands, as well as the CZMA's general consideration of the 
national interest and national defense, requires an understanding 
lands falling within the federal exclusion . 
• 1 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, APPROVED STATE OF CALIFORNIA COASTAL MANAGE-
MENT PROGRAM AND FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, Chapter 11, p. 87 (August, 
1977). One commentator has made the argument that the states have authority to integrate 
management on federal coastal lands despite the Attorney General's opinion on excluded 
land. See Shapiro, Coastal Zone Management and Excluded Federal Lands: The Viability 
of Continued Federalism in the Management of Federal Coastlands, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1011 
(1979) . 
•• State of Washington Department of Ecology v. United States, No. 78-223 (W.D. Wash.) 
(filed April 13, 1978) . 
.. See generally 15 C.F.R., Part 930 (1979). 
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of the place of the Act in the overall scheme of federal-state rela-
tionships. The appropriate starting point for such an analysis is in 
the principle of federal supremacy.1I1I The constitutional immunity 
of the federal government from state interference with its pro-
grams and activities was confirmed in McCulloch v. Maryland, 118 
and has been reaffirmed, without substantial change, ever since.1I7 
Only Congress may oblige federal agencies to conform their activi-
ties to state laws or programs.1I8 States may enforce such federal 
agency obligations only where the congressional intent is clear and 
unambiguous.69 
These principles of federal supremacy have been reflected and 
preserved in the CZMA. The Act provides that nothing in the 
CZMA shall be construed to diminish either federal or state juris-
diction in the "planning, development or control of water resources 
or navigable waters," and the Act does not modify or repeal any 
existing laws applicable to federal agencies.80 The supremacy doc-
trine is also evident in the provisions for federal approval of state 
management programs in the federal consistency provisions of the 
Act. For example, before approving a management program, the 
Secretary of Commerce is required to find that the program has 
been developed "with the opportunity of full participation by rele-
vant Federal agencies," and that the program "provides for ade-
quate consideration of the national interest involved in the siting 
of facilities necessary to meet requirements which are other than 
local in nature."81 The program may not be approved "unless the 
views of Federal agencies principally affected by such programs 
have been adequately considered."82 Most importantly, with re-
•• The supremacy clause is found in U.S. CONST. art. VI, Cl. 2 . 
.. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
57 See, e.g., Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976); and E.P.A. v. California Water Re-
sources Control Board, 426 U.S. 224 (1976) . 
.. Id . 
•• In Hancock, note 57, supra, the State of Kentucky claimed the right under the Clean 
Air Act, to demand compliance by federal installations with state requirements for permits 
to operate air contaminant sources. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled against Kentucky's claim 
stating, U[blecause of the fundamental importance of the principles shielding federal instal-
lations and activities from regulation by the states, an authoriziation of state regulation is 
found only when and to the extent there is 'a clear Congressional mandate, or specific Con-
gressional action' that makes authorization of state regulation clear and unambiguous." 
Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179 (1976) (Court's footnotes omitted) . 
•• 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(e) (West Supp. 1979). 
II 16 U.S.C.A. § 1455(c) (West Supp. 1979) . 
• 1 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(b) (West Supp. 1979). 
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spect to federal activities, the obligation of the federal agency is 
not compliance with the state plan, but only consistency "to the 
maximum extent practicable," and then only when those activities 
"directly" affect the coastal zone or are development projects in 
the coastal zone.8S For federal agency activities on excluded lands 
or otherwise outside the coastal zone, where there is no spillover 
affect on the coastal zone, the CZMA imposes no limitations on the 
agencies' activity. Thus, the CZMA carves out a carefully drawn 
congressional requirement for maximum practicable consistency of 
agency planning (and execution of plans) with state regulations in 
the coastal zone when federal activities directly affect areas of 
state responsibility. The entire obligation imposed upon federal 
agencies by the CZMA comes from federal authority; there is no 
language, such as that in the Clear Air Act,84 extending authority 
to the state to directly govern or constrain such activities of federal 
agencies. It must therefore be concluded that the only enforcement 
option available to the state, should secretarial mediation not 
prove effective, is to seek judicial review of the agencies' compli-
ance with applicable federal law. 
This general deference to federal agency authority under the 
CZMA should apply with special force to national defense activi-
ties. Such activities are perhaps the paradigm case for the applica-
tion of federal supremacy. The power to declare war, and to raise, 
support, maintain, and direct the Army and Navy, has constitu-
tionally been reserved to the federal government.811 In the exercise 
of this power, Congress and the President have been accorded the 
widest latitute and greatest discretion in decision making,88 and it 
follows that the scope of federal supremacy, and freedom from 
state interference, is correspondingly broad. "National defense" is 
a concept generally understood but rarely defined explicitly. Deriv-
ing from Congress' constitutionally mandated power to "provide 
for the common defense,"87 national defense has been construed by 
numerous statutes to encompass a wide range of federal activities. 
Though primary responsibility lies with the Department of De-
•• 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c) (West Supp. 1979) . 
.. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7418 (West Supp. 1979) . 
•• U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, Clauses 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16; § 9; and art. II, § 2, Cl. 3 . 
.. See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1947); United States v. O'Brien, 391 
U.S. 367, reh. den. 89 S.Ct. 63 (1968); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); Cafeteria and 
Restaurant Workers Union Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, reh. den. 368 U.S. 
869 (1961). 
'7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
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fense, numerous agencies, including NASA, the Department of 
Commerce, the Department of Transportation, the F.B.I., and the 
State Department, engage in defense related missions. Courts gen-
erally have defined "national defense" quite broadly.68 
It must thus be borne in mind that the national defense is, con-
stitutionally, a responsibility exclusively of the federal government; 
state participation is expressly limited by the Constitution to spec-
ified activities, and then only when permitted by Congress. Na-
tional defense is not an area of government responsibility like 
housing, transportation, and resources development, where federal, 
state, and local government agencies all have independent and 
sometimes overlapping authority and for which coordinated inter-
governmental planning is essential and appropriate. National de-
fense is a federal matter, and with the exception of environmental 
protection,68 all regulation of the Armed Forces is accomplished 
exclusively and intimately by Congress, and the President. Noth-
. ing in the language of the CZMA suggests a change in this federal-
. state relationship with respect to national defense interests. 
III. CONSIDERATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS BY 
STATE AND LOCAL COASTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS 
A. Introduction 
Supremacy doctrine and excluded lands notwithstanding, state 
and local governments are granted a considerable degree of in-
volvement in federal agency decision making under the CZMA. 
Not surprisingly, this authority has been differently exercised by 
different states. NOAA, in determining how much disparity should 
be permitted between different states' consideration of national in-
terests, might properly have taken into account the different pur-
poses and organizational structures of the federal agencies. For ex-
ample, for the national defense agencies, with primarily national 
rather than local orientations and with extremely centralized pat-
terns of planning and decision making, a uniform scheme of state 
consideration of national defense interests would vastly simplify 
and facilitate the federal consistency process. Nevertheless, neither 
the NOAA regulations nor the NOAA program approval process 
•• See, e.g., United States v. Achtenberg, 459 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1972) cert. denied 409 U.S. 
932 (1972); Gorin v. United States, 111 F.2d 712, 721 (9th Cir. 1940) aff'd 312 U.S. 19 
(1941); United States v. McGee, 432 F. Supp. 557, 561 (S.D. Ohio 1977) . 
•• See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (West Supp. 1979). 
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have produced this result. Various state management programs 
give varying degrees of consideration, in policy statements and 
statutory language, to the issue of balancing national defense inter-
ests. Furthermore, even where the language of a program indicates 
careful attention to the defense question, there have often been 
substantial differences between that language and the practice of 
state and local coastal commissions. 
Of the thirty-six states and territories located in the coastal 
zone, fifteen have had their management programs approved by 
NOAA.70 These include all states along the Pacific Coast. In addi-
tion, some of these states are divided into regions for purposes of 
coastal management. California, for example, is divided into two 
regions-the San Francisco Bay Area and the remainder of the 
state. Two separate programs, the San Francisco Bay Area Conser-
vation and Development Commission Program and the California 
Coastal Management Program, were approved by NOAA.71 Rather 
than attempting a comprehensive analysis of all the approved state 
programs, this article will focus on a few representative cases 
which demonstrate different state approaches to consideration of 
national defense interests. These are the State of Washington 
Coastal Zone Management Program, the Management Program for 
the San Francisco Bay, the California Coastal Management Pro-
gram, and certain local programs in California. The high concen-
tration of military facilities and activities in these areas makes 
consideration of the national defense question particularly 
significant.71 
B. State Management Programs 
In 1976 the State of Washington's Coastal Zone Management 
Program (WCZMP) became the first NOAA approved state plan. 
The Program identifies forty-nine major military installations lo-
cated on the Washington coast.78 Though dissatisfied with the U.S . 
• 0 The fifteen states and territories which have approved coastal management programs 
as of August 1, 1979, in chronological order of approval, are: Washington, Oregon, Califor-
nia, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Rhode Island, Michigan, North Carolina, Puerto Rico, Ha-
waii, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Virgin Islands, and Alaska. Alaska's program was ap-
proved on August 1, 1979. See CZM INrORMATlON EXCHANGE, STATUS or THE STATES (July 1, 
1979). 
71 The Management Program for San Francisco Bay received NOAA approval in Febru-
ary, 1977, six months prior to that of the California Coastal Management Program . 
•• In the San Diego area alone are located more than one-fourth of all Navy personnel . 
•• U.S. DEP'T or COMMERCE, STATE or WASHINGTON COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT PRO-
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Attorney General's opinion on excluded lands,'14 the WCZMP rec-
ognizes that "lands held by the U.S. Government for readily iden-
tifiable national security purposes will be excluded from the state's 
coastal zone. "'111 The Program further states that Department of 
Defense bases, construction activities, and military maneuvers are 
generally excluded from direct state control. '18 Also, the WCZMP 
notes that "the primary mission of the U.S. Navy is national de-
fense, which gives it high priority in competing for the land and 
water resources of the state's coastal zone."'1'1 These policy state-
ments appear to indicate that the WCZMP responded to the com-
ments it solicited from the Navy and other federal agencies and 
made "a positive declaration of the priority of national defense and 
the importance to the state of the Navy presence in the coastal 
zone."'18 However, Washington's consideration and inclusion of 
Navy comments at an early stage in the development of the 
WCZMP's policy statements so far have resulted in few conflicts 
between the state's coastal management agency and federal agen-
cies concerned with national defense. '18 
Other state management programs have been more problematic. 
The San Francisco Bay area developed a coastally-related manage-
ment program even prior to the passage of the CZMA. The San 
Francisco Bay Area Conservation and Development Commission 
(BCDC) Plan of 1969 was the first of its type. so One aspect of that 
plan was the comprehensive regulation of development in the 
coastal areas around the Bay. Although quite detailed in many re-
GRAM, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, V-46 (1975) . 
.. See State of Washington Department of Ecology v. United States, 78-223 (W.D. Wash.) 
(filed April 13, 1978) . 
•• STATE DEP'T or ECOLOGY, WASHINGTON STATE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
118 (1976) . 
•• [d. at 107 . 
.. [d. 
'S U.S. DEP'T or COMMERCE, supra note 73, at X-47. 
•• A case in point is the construction of the TRIDENT magnetic silencing pier at the 
submarine base in Bangor, Washington. Even though the pier facility did not conform to the 
State's coastal management policies of increased public access and recreation, the State De-
partment of Ecology conceded that because of national defense interests there was no prac-
tical alternative to construction and thus the project was consistent to the maximum extent 
possible. See Memorandum of Compliance with State of Washington Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Program from Officer in Charge of Construction, TRIDENT, to Army Corps of Engi-
neers, Seattle, Washington (Sept. 10, 1976). 
10 SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION, SAN FRANCISCO BAY 
PLAN (January 1969); see also the McAteer-Petris Act, CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 66600-66661 
(West Supp. 1979). 
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spects, the BCnC Plan paid little attention to the question of na-
tional defense interests. Furthermore, the plan contained detailed 
maps designating proposed civilian uses on all military lands in the 
area.81 
In 1976 the BCnC submitted its Management Program for the 
San Francisco Bay to NOAA for approval. Specific reference was 
made in the Program to the national defense interest.82 However, 
the maps from the 1969 Plan, designating proposed civilian uses on 
military lands, were also included. NOAA did not require that the 
federal land be excluded from the maps and they arguably thus 
became part of the approved coastal management program.83 In 
addition, though the San Francisco Bay's coastal zone is statutorily 
limited to land within 100 feet of the shoreline,84 many of the pro-
gram's regulations purport to extend to land, including land of the 
federal government, which is much further landward.811 These pro-
visions of the NOAA approved program appear to conflict with the 
excluded lands clause of the CZMA, even though that clause is 
supposedly recognized by the BenC.86 Thus a federal agency is 
placed in the awkward and potentially troublesome position of 
evaluating its consistency obligations against conflicting mandates 
from a federally approved state program and a federal policy on 
excluded lands. 
Shortly after certifying the San Francisco Bay program, NOAA 
approved the California Coastal Management Program (CCMP).87 
This program coordinates coastal activities for all of California, ex-
cluding the San Francisco Bay Area, and is administered by the 
California Coastal Commission (CCC). The language of the CCMP 
., See, e.g., Map 2-Proposed Major Uses of the Bay and Shoreline, in SAN FRANCISCO 
BAY CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION, supra note 80 . 
•• The MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY (July 15, 1976), states at 23, 
"Use of the shoreline and adjacent waters of the Bay for national defense and security is of 
paramount importance." 
.. [d. at Appendix IV . 
.. CAL. Gov. CODE § 66610(b) (West Supp. 1979) . 
.. See designated uses of land in the maps in SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION AND DE-
VELOPMENT COMMISSION, supra note SO. 
.. MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, supra note 82, at 13. 
n U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 45; see also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30174 
(West Supp. 1979). California enacted a Coastal Zone Conservation Act in 1972, indepen-
dent of the CZMA. The California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission was established 
to administer that act. The present California Coastal Act, declaring itself to be the Califor-
nia coastal zone management program for purposes of the CZMA, is a successor to the 
Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972, and the California Coastal Commission is the suc-
cessor of the Coastal Zone Conservation Commission. 
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appears to recognize national defense as an important aspect of the 
national interest. The Program states: 
[U]se of the coastal land area and adjacent waters for national defense 
and national security is of paramount importance and is among the 
highest priority [sic] in the management of the coastal zone. Many of 
the military installations located along the coast have defense missions 
requiring operational use of the coastal zone. In addition, military in-
stallations are important components in their local areas, and re-
present a stable and substantial contribution to the coast and state 
economy.88 
Recognition of defense interests in this particular area is partic-
ularly important as the California coastal area contains numerous 
Department of Defense and Coast Guard facilities. One fourth of 
the entire Navy fleet is home-ported in San Diego. In the Califor-
nia program, national defense and aerospace are also specifically 
recognized as components of the national interests in the siting of 
facilities.89 In addition, the program acknowledges an exception 
from the general policy of joint local, regional, state, and federal 
agencies' determination of the national interest for "national de-
fense and security needs as established by the President and Con-
gress."90 The CCMP makes specific mention of the Navy's coopera-
tion and input in the development of the program, and 
acknowledges that the Navy is "the Federal agency most depen-
dent on coastal installations for its continued operations. "91 The 
Program also recognizes the Navy's policy of conducting activities 
"to the maximum extent practicable consistent with the CCMP so 
long as national defense objectives are met."92 Finally, the CCC 
somewhat reluctantly has adopted the U.S. Attorney General's in-
terpretation that all lands owned or leased by the United States 
are excluded from the coastal zone.93 Each of the above provisions 
appears facially to justify NOAA's decision that "adequate consid-
eration" was given to federal agencies' views on national defense." 
.. u.s. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 45, at 82 . 
•• Id. at 83 (Table I) . 
.. Id. at 87 . 
.. Id . 
•• Id.; See also OPNAV Instruction UOOO.14 (Sept. 25, 1976) . 
•• See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 45 . 
.. Though it did not consider the question of national defense, the 9th Circuit did affirm 
the CCMP's consideration of the national interest in A.P.I. v. Knecht, 609 F.2d 1306 (9th 
Cir. 1979). 
726 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 8:705 
Close examination of the CCMP and subsequent California pro-
posed regulations, however, reveals some current and potential 
problems. Excluded federal lands are identified in the Program by 
a 1974 General Services Administration list rather than by actual 
mapping.1I1I Failure to provide detailed and clearly drawn bounda-
ries can lead to excluded land being included within a local coastal 
program," with serious potential for future conflicts between local 
coastal agencies attempting to enforce their approved plans and 
federal agencies refusing to acknowledge their applicability. While 
Navy and other military activities are generally recognized as im-
portant coastal-dependent activities in the CCMP, the California 
Program does not specifically include Navy functions as coastal-
dependent development activities, nor is national defense listed as 
a permitted development activity.lI? Although most military activi-
ties would take place on excluded lands and not be subject to state 
development activity regulations, many national defense projects 
occur or spill over onto non-excluded lands. Furthermore, the 
CCMP does not specifically deal with the question of expansion of 
defense holdings. In the area of license and permit activities, fed-
eral agencies are not required to obtain CCC permits. However, the 
CCMP provides for requests for memoranda of understanding 
from those federal agencies for development projects, even though 
there is no authorization in the CZMA or the NOAA regulations 
for so doing.1I8 Finally, the CCC has recently proposed regulations 
for reviewing federal agency consistency with the CCMP. 99 While 
these regulations have not yet been incorporated into the approved 
Program, they are indicative of the manner in which the CCC 
desires to implement its Program. The regulations give no hint of 
the manner in which the state will evaluate national defense con-
siderations in determining what constitutes consistency "to the 
maximum extent practicable." As will be more fully described be-
low, failure to clarify this standard can have adverse effects on lo-
cal coastal programs . 
•• u.s. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 45, at D-18 . 
.. See text accompanying note 112 infra. 
e? u.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 45, at J-24 (Department of Defense Comments) . 
.. [d. at 92. 
.. Letter from William Boyd, Chief Sta1f Council of the California Coastal Commission, 
to the State Commission and Interested Parties (June 26, 1979). 
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C. California Local Coastal Programs 
The CCMP establishes the general policies and framework for 
coastal zone management, but the local coastal programs (LCP's), 
established and formalized by municipalities or other local govern-
mental entities, and approved by the CCC, contain the specific de-
tails. Once the LCP's are determined to be part of the state's "ap-
proved management program," federal consistency requirements 
may apply. 100 Within the jurisdiction of the CCC are sixty-eight 
LCP'S.lOl In addition, there are four port master plans. 101 Instead 
of being submitted for NOAA approval as amendments to the 
CCMP, with extensive attendant formalities and procedural re-
quirements/08 the LCP's and the port master plans are to be certi-
fied by the CCC as refinements to the CCMP, thus eliminating 
much of the administrative burden associated with amendments. 1M 
During the certification process federal agencies and NOAA may 
comment on the local programs, but the state is not bound by 
these comments in its certification. 1011 Nevertheless, NOAA must 
approve such refinementsloe to ensure that no LCP in fact consti-
tutes an unapproved amendment to the CCMP. Once an LCP or 
port plan is certified and approved, the policies therein become 
factors in the federal consistency determination, although NOAA 
regulations appear to restrict the actual processing of consistency 
determinations to the CCC itself. 10' Though there has been consid-
erable activity in drafting of LCP's, none have received certifica-
tion. Two of the port master plans, Port Hueneme and Long 
Beach, have received provisional certification, but port authorities 
with certified port master plans may make consistency determina-
tions under certain circumstances. 108 The CCMP also states, 
"[b]ecause local governments will participate in the state's imple-
100 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c) (West Supp. 1979). 
101 There is an LCP for each of the fifteen counties and fifty-three cities and towns in the 
region. 
101 The Port Master Plans are for the ports of Los Angeles, San Diego, Long Beach, and 
Port Hueneme. They are intended to furnish specific local coastal programs for these ports 
in the same manner as LCP's furnish coastal management programs for coastal 
communities. 
108 15 C.F.R. § 923.81 (1979). 
104 15 C.F.R. § 923.83. 
10. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 52, at 56-61. 
I" 15 C.F.R. § 923.82(a) (1979). 
10' 15 C.F.R. § 930.18 (1979). 
101 CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30715 (West Supp. 1979). 
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mentation of the Federal consistency provisions, LCPs can affect 
Federal actions; therefore, it is essential that the views of Federal 
agencies affected by the local program be considered in its develop-
ment."109 However, the practical difficulties for federal agen-
cies-especially the smaller agencies such as the Coast Guard-of 
monitoring the development of sixty-eight different programs, and 
attempting consistency with their varying requirements, imply that 
the CCC's role in reviewing and approving these plans is crucial for 
insuring uniform national defense considerations in the LCP's. 
Challenging each LCP separately, especially when there is no clear, 
objective, or uniform state standard for consideration of the na-
tional defense interest, would be an unfair and overly burdensome 
requirement for the federal agencies. 
The draft LCP's and port master plans, like the various state 
coastal management plans, have differed in their treatment of the 
national defense interest. The Port of Hueneme plan states that 
the port "has an obligation to meet national needs, expressed in 
terms of the requirements both of the U.S. Navy and for alterna-
tives to the region's major port facilities in emergencies. "110 It also 
recognizes that "[t]he U.S. Navy exercises control over the vast 
majority of the port land area. This Navy area is restricted from 
public access for reasons of military security."lll Nevertheless, the 
plan has included some Navy land and some land outside of the 
coastal zone. 111 On the other hand, the other certified port master 
plan-Long Beach-has clearly recognized federally excluded 
lands in implementing its plan.ll3 LCP's also fail at times to fully 
recognize defense interests. One partially completed draft LCP 
that is particularly important to national defense interests is that 
of the City of Corona:do in the San Diego area. Partially or wholly 
located within the city are three major Naval installations: North 
Island Naval Air Station, the Coronado Naval Amphibious Base, 
and the Imperial Beach Radio Facility. Yet despite the location of 
these military installations the LCP makes no mention of balanc-
ing national defense interests. ll4 Furthermore, the LCP has tenta-
'00 u.s. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 52, at 86. 
no MASTER DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR THE PORT HUENEME, B-4 (July 1978). 
III Id. at C-14. 
, .. See id. at A-3. 
na FINAL MASTER PLAN, PORT OF LONG BEACH 18 (June 1978). 
114 See CORONADO PLANNING COMMISSION, LCP POLICY GROUP REPORTS 103 & 104 (Jan. 9, 
1979) & 105 (Jan. 23, 1979). 
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tively proposed using parts of the Air Station and Amphibious 
Base as beaches. While the Coronado LCP has not yet been certi-
fied by the state, and may be amended, it is illustrative of poten-
tial major conflicts with national defense interests. In addition, 
Coronado, Port Hueneme, and Long Beach show that there is no 
real uniformity in considering federally imposed requirements 
which affect national defense and other aspects of the national 
interest. 
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Introduction 
The above examination of local and state management pro-
grams, NOAA regulations, and the CZMA illustrates that each of 
these levels of government has grappled to some degree with the 
balancing of national defense in the coastal zone. This analysis also 
suggests, however, that the failure to express policy comprehen-
sively and clearly at the national level can lead to inadequate con-
sideration of the national interest at the state and local level. Flex-
ibility to incorporate local desires is an important component of 
the CZMA framework; nevertheless, an equally if not more impor-
tant goal of the CZMA is to ensure adequate consideration of the 
national interest and "unified policies, criteria, standards, meth-
ods, and processes for dealing with land and water use decisions of 
more than local significance. "1111 The CZMA has laid the basic 
foundation for accomplishing these goals, but additional policy rec-
ommendations appear desirable to strengthen and clarify applica-
tion of national interest concerns at the local level. Otherwise, vital 
national interests may become unnecessarily entangled in the 
"maze" of bureaucracy potentially created by the CZMA and its 
offspring.11s 
These considerations suggest the need for clarification of the 
permissible scope of state regulation of federal activities, particu-
larly those relating to national defense, which are governed by the 
supremacy clause. Accordingly, this article suggests that such clari-
fication will be facilitated by uniform state management program 
adoption of the following three policy proposals: (1) states and lo-
cal coastal agencies should expressly adopt and adhere to the cur-
110 16 V.S.C.A. § 1451(h) (West Supp. 1979). 
118 See A.P.I. v. Knecht, 456 F. Supp. 880, 931 (C.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd 609 F.2d 1306 (9th 
Cir. 1979). 
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rent NOAA view of the excluded lands clause; (2) on non-excluded 
lands the consistency of federal activities with the state manage-
ment program should be determined by the federal agency where 
that activity is "coastally dependent"; and (3) where the federal 
supremacy doctrine is applicable to an activity, states should defer 
to the federal agency's views in defining the national interest with 
respect to that activity. While these proposals would result in a 
major change in clarifying the state-federal division of responsibil-
ity, they nevertheless have their basis firmly fixed in the overall 
constitutional framework of the CZMA. 
B. Uniform Adoption of the Current NOAA Position on 
Excluded Federal Lands 
In light of the importance of federal land exclusion in the 
scheme of the CZMA, states and LCP's should unequivocally and 
uniformly implement the position of the U.S. Attorney General 
and NOAA on excluded federal lands. This would result in the rel-
evant agencies' internal policies rather than the CZMA or state 
management programs governing all federal activities taking place 
on excluded land without direct spillover impacts in the coastal 
zone. In the case of national defense these activities include opera-
tional, coastal defense, research and development, maintenance, 
support, and training activities. 
The Attorney General's office concluded in 1976 that all lands 
owned by the United States were excluded from the definition of 
the coastal zone under the CZMA.ll7 NOAA regulations have ad-
ded federally leased lands to those exclusions.118 As explained 
above, some of the states have argued that only lands held by the 
federal government under exclusive legislative jurisdiction are 
within the statutory exclusion from the coastal zone, and that the 
U.S. Attorney General's view undermines the federal consistency 
provisions of the CZMA.1l8 However, the Attorney General's opin-
ion shows that these arguments confuse the federal government's 
discretion to use land under the Property Clause of the Constitu-
tion with the power to exercise legislative jurisdiction.120 The type 
of legislative jurisdiction under which federal land is held indicates 
117 Scalia, supra note 48. 
"8 15 C.F.R. § 923.33 (1979). 
110 See State of Washington Department of Ecology v. United States, No. 78-223 (W.D. 
Wash.) (filed April 13, 1978). 
110 Scalia, supra note 48. 
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the degree to which the federal government can exercise legislative, 
executive, and judicial functions on that land. For example, where 
the federal land is held under exclusive legislative jurisdiction, only 
federal legislation governs criminal activity on that land. III But the 
degree of legislative jurisdiction does not imply a particular land 
use activity and has no relationship to coastal resources. The 
Navy's policy is that if legislative jurisdiction is necessary, "the de-
gree of jurisdiction sought should be limited to the minimum de-
gree of jurisdiction required. "111 Lack of connection between type 
of legislative jurisdiction and the nature of the federal activity is 
illustrated by the fact that different parcels on a single base are 
sometimes held under different types of jurisdiction. An example is 
Sewells Point Naval Base in Norfolk, Virginia; part of which is 
held under exclusive jurisdiction, part under concurrent jurisdic-
tion, and part under proprietary jurisdiction. III The interpretation 
advanced by some of the states would result in part of the Base 
being in and part out of the coastal zone. 
In addition to the irrelevance of the type of legislative jurisdic-
tion to the exclusion issue, there are other arguments supporting 
the U.S. Attorney General's view. The federal government has ple-
nary powers to regulate its land under the Supremacy and Prop-
erty Clauses of the Constitution.114 When those plenary powers are 
applicable, federal use of land held by the United States under 
even proprietary jurisdiction cannot be limited by the states. I .. 
The argument that the Attorney General's interpretation of the ex-
cluded lands provision undermines the federal consistency provi-
sions of the CZMA fails to take account of the Act's deliberate 
preservation of federal supremacy principles. III NOAA regulations 
also reflect these principles in requiring consistency determinations 
only for direct spillover effects from federal activities on excluded 
lands, and as to such spillover effects, federal agencies must be 
III See note 47 supra . 
... NAVAL FACILITIBS ENGINBBRING COMMAND, REAL ESTATE PROCEDURE MANUAL P-73 at 
26-3 (June 1976). In this senae exclusive jurisdiction ia the maximum degree while 
proprietorial is the minimum. 
III Scalia, supra note 48. 
1" Supremacy Clause-U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2; Property Clause-U.S. CONST., art. IV, 
§ 3, d. 2. 
1., See generally Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976); Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 
272 (1954). See also Shapiro, supra note 52, at 1017. 
III See note 60 supra. 
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consistent only to the "maximum extent practicable."127 One com-
mentator has aptly noted that consistency "escape" clausesl28 and 
the Act's provisions for mediation, are inconsistent with any inter-
pretation of the Act which would subject all federal agency action 
to state control by including federal land within the coastal zone.128 
The states' fear of inconsistent federal activity on excluded land 
should be mitigated by NOAA regulations and the agencies' own 
policies. l3O Thus statutory analysis and constitutional doctrine in-
dicate that the U.S. Attorney General's and NOAA's interpretation 
is correct. Accordingly, this interpretation of the excluded lands 
provision should be explicitly noted and implemented in all state 
and local management programs. 
C. Consistency Determinations for "Coastally-Dependant" 
Activities 
Clarification of the excluded lands issue will alleviate some, but 
not all, of the federal-state controversy over the national interests 
and national defense issues. Balancing defense against other inter-
ests in the coastal zone will still take place and consistency deter-
minations will still have to be made for spillover effects of activi-
ties onto non-excluded land. Under the second policy proposal, 
whether an activity on non-excluded land is consistent with the 
state or local plan would be determined solely by the federal 
agency responsible for carrying out such activities when the follow-
ing three conditions are met. First, the activity should be one sub-
ject to the federal supremacy doctrine. Although this distinction is 
not always clear-cut, certain types of activities, such as national 
defense, clearly fall within the supremacy doctrine. l8l Second, the 
activity must be carried out pursuant to and in conformity with 
federal law (apart from the CZMA). Third, any activity or spillover 
effect on non-excluded land should be "coastally dependent." In 
these circumstances, the federal agency's decision as to whether an 
activity is coastally dependent and whether there is consistency to 
the maximum extent practicable with the state's coastal plan 
'17 15 C.F.R. § 923.33 (1979). 
, •• See 16 V.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(3) and (d) (West Supp. 1979) . 
... Williamson, supra note 46, at 441. 
II. See, e.g., Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 11000.14 (Sept. 25, 1976) setting out 
specific guidelines for Naval activities' consistency with state and local coastal management 
programs. 
111 See note 26 supra. 
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should be conclusive, as long as the federal agency has not arbi-
trarily and capriciously abused its discretion. 132 
In the case of national defense, whether an activity is coastally 
dependent is easily determined. Any function requiring access to 
the oceans, including but not limited to Navy ship activities, ocean 
surveillance, air base locations, and missile retrieval, clearly fits 
into this category. In addition, any activity which is necessary to 
support a coastally dependent excluded land facility would be 
coastally dependent. Thus a military commissary or laundry, or a 
base service obtained through a contract or concession, required by 
a coastally dependent or excluded facility must also be recognized 
as part of the national defense interest in the coastal zone. In de-
termining whether a support activity is, in fact, "necessary" to 
support an excluded facility, deference should be given to the com-
mander of the relevant facility. Since these activities are essen-
tially tied to national defense, the supremacy doctrine implies that 
review of the military commander's discretion in this area be lim-
ited to an "arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion" standard. 
The same standard should apply to other activities governed by 
federal supremacy such as energy conservation or aids to 
navigation. 
D. Deference to Federal Agencies' Definition of the National 
Interest 
The third policy proposal would require the state and local man-
agement programs to adopt relevant federal agencies' definitions of 
national interests where those interests demand federal agency ac-
tion under the supremacy doctrine. The states would be required 
to defer to the federal agencies' views unless an agency's determi-
nation constitutes an arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion. 
Review of such an abuse could be made by the Secretary of Com-
merce with appeal available in federal court.133 The CZMA and 
NOAA regulations currently require the states to give adequate 
consideration to federal agency viewpoints. m This proposal would 
help to clarify "adequate consideration" in a manner consistent 
with the supremacy doctrine. 
U' For an analogous application of the arbitrary and capricious standard to federal 
agency discretion see Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). 
,aa Such review is consistent with the overall framework of the CZMA. See note 20 supra. 
'34 See notes 21-24 supra. 
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Two threshold terms must be defined in applying this proposal: 
"activities subject to the supremacy doctrine" and "the relevant 
federal agency." The CZMA itself, and some recent court decisions, 
shed some light on when the supremacy doctrine applies to federal 
activities. The Act establishes a system of "cooperative federalism" 
where the states and the federal government share authority in the 
coastal zone. lSI The legislative history of the Act, however, demon-
strates that certain interests and activities such as navigation and 
military uses are direct and exclusive federal responsibilities, while 
other interests, including economic development, recreation, and 
conservation, are shared by the federal government and the 
stateS.lS8 Two cases involving state regulation of activities along 
the coast, Askew v. American Water Way Operators, Inc.187 and 
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Company,lS8 suggest an approach to bal-
ancing state and federal interests which is cautious, though some-
what favorable to the stateS.lS9 In Askew the Court upheld Flor-
ida's imposition of strict liability under the state's Oil Spill 
Prevention and Pollution Control Act against an assertion of fed-
eral preemption. Ray invalidated a part of the State of Washing-
ton's Tanker Law, but upheld the remainder of that law as not 
violative of federal preemption doctrines. These cases appear to 
hold that a state's exercise of its police power in areas where fed-
eral law also applies will not be invalidated unless there is direct 
conflict with federal law or with explicit Congressional policy call-
ing for national conformity in an area.140 The courts have yet to 
rule on a conflict between national defense and state coastal zone 
regulations. However, the legislative history of the CZMA 141 and a 
clear policy of national conformity in the defense area141 suggests 
that the national defense interest should prevail in any serious 
conflict with the state management program. Similarly, except in 
5. 
'"' See Williamson, supra note 46, at 441-42; See also Schoenbaum & Parker, supra note 
, .. S. REp., supra note 1, at [1972) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4778. 
'"' 411 U.S. 325 (1973). 
, .. 435 U.S. 151 (1978). 
, .. See Schoenbaum & Parker, supra note 5, at 155-59; Finnell, supra note 5, at 257-58, 
287; Wrede, Preemption and the Role of State Legislation in the Coastal Zone, 10 NATURAL 
REsoURCES LAWYER 237 (1976). 
, •• See Ray V. Atlantic Richfield Company, 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978); Askew V. American 
Waterway Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 341 (1979). 
,., See text accompanying note 136 supra. 
, •• S. REP., supra note 1, at [1972) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4778. 
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extraordinary circumstances, the federal agency's view of what that 
national interest is should be incorporated into the state's manage-
ment program. 
The "relevant federal agency" for purposes of defining the na-
tional interests would be the agency primarily responsible for car-
rying out that interest in the particular coastal zone. Usually it will 
be clear from federal legislation or customary practice which 
agency has primary responsibility. Occasionally, however, agencies 
may have overlapping duties in a coastal area and their views of 
the national interest may differ with respect to a particular activ-
ity. Resolution of such a conflict between federal agencies is a po-
litical decision to be made either by Congress or the President. 
The same is true if various national interests subject to the 
supremacy clause overlap. 
The overall importance of national defense to national self-pres-
ervation is clear. However, in certain areas, traditionally defined 
national defense functions appear to overlap with other national 
interests. For example, with the current world oil situation, it 
could be argued that energy production in the coastal zone is actu-
ally part of the national defense. In such a case the establishment 
and ranking of priorities should be accomplished by Congress. A 
distinction also could be made depending on the nature of the in-
terest in question. Energy, commerce, and conservation interests 
often have priorities as important as defense. On the other hand, 
recreation and public access generally are, and should be, subordi-
nated to the above interests. Thus, in determining the relevant 
federal agency, legal arguments may at times be subordinated to 
political considerations. 
Once it is determined that a federal activity is governed by the 
supremacy doctrine and that a specific agency is responsible, defer-
ence should be given to the agency's views in defining that national 
interest. The federal agency will be in the best position to define 
the practical limitations of comprehensive coastal management 
with respect to its activities. Not all federal activities would impose 
the same degree of limitations on state planning. For example, the 
defense agencies, perhaps to a greater degree than most other..fed-
eral agencies, must be able to respond quickly and flexibly to ac-
commodate changes in mission, in operational requirements, and 
in the need for and utilization of facilities. The Armed Forces must 
be responsive to rapidly changing technological and political cir-
cumstances; and to a far greater degree than most other govern-
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mental agencies, they have special needs for physical and informa-
tional security. Therefore, potential expansion of defense activities 
and flexibility for urgent actions must be recognized in all state 
programs. Not every activity conducted by a defense agency is vi-
tal to the national defense and therefore subject to identical 
supremacy considerations. However, since the line distinguishing 
such activities is often very fine, and a mistake in the direction of 
limiting defense capabilities would be extremely costly, deference 
should be given to the federal agency's views unless an abuse of 
discretion can be shown. 148 
The initial development of the state and local program is the 
most appropriate time to solicit and incorporate the federal agen-
cies' views as to what the national interests are. The states with 
final programs already approved by NOAA could argue that this 
policy proposal would be too radical a change.w However, this po-
tential opposition to the policy proposal has little practical or legal 
merit. First, the requirement to incorporate the federal agency's 
definition of national interest only applies to those federal activi-
ties subject to supremacy principles. Moreover, the state can chal-
lenge such a definition by showing a federal agency's arbitrary and 
capricious abuse of discretion. In addition, radical deletion of 
wording in existing state plans would rarely occur since little spe-
cific attention has been given to such national interests. 
For federal agencies such as the Department of Defense, consis-
tency with coastal management programs is just one of many, 
often competing, congressional mandates. Resolution of these con-
flicting mandates should be made by the Department of Defense 
decision makers who are in the best position to evaluate all of their 
competing responsibilities. It should be noted, moreover, that 
many of the states' objections to defense activities in the coastal 
zone are remedied by other federal legislation and regulations. The 
expansion and limitation of public access to the coast, as illus-
trated in the discussion of the Coronado LCP above, are poten-
tially troublesome areas of conflict between local programs and na-
tional defense interests. Safety problems and the often classified 
nature of the defense activity make access to military lands im-
practical in many cases. Nevertheless, Department of Defense reg-
••• See note 132 supra . 
••• See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE RESPONSE TO PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CZMA AMENDMENTS OF 1980, § 307 at 6 (January 29, 1980). 
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ulations require consultation with state, local, and other federal 
agencies in planning facilities and development projects, whether 
or not located in the coastal zone, 1411 and in this process, public 
access and any other state concerns can be raised and addressed. 
Other federal laws mandate public access in certain areas.146 Envi-
ronmental interests are also protected by other statutes. The 
CZMA states that it shall not affect in any way the requirements 
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act or the Clean Air Act. 147 
Court interpretations of national security and the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA) suggest that military activities have 
only a partial exemption and are judged on a case by case basis.l48 
Thus accomodation of defense activities with respect to various 
coastal interests is mandated by other federal regulations. Defer-
ence to federal agencies in defining the national interest would 
therefore not result in as great a change as some states seem to 
fear. 
E. Policy Proposal Overview 
These three policy proposals provide a more comprehensive ba-
sis than the current NOAA regulations for division of state and 
federal responsibility under the CZMA. Specifically, the proposals 
permit increased flexibility in state programs for accomodating na-
tional defense needs, and for determining whether an activity is 
"necessary in the interest of national security." The proposed poli-
cies will deal with most potential national defense activities, not 
just the variance procedures specified in the CZMA. After all, a 
state program which truly incorporates national interest considera-
tions should structure its stated priorities in such a way that an 
activity which is indeed necessary in the interest of national de-
fense is, by virtue of that fact alone, consistent with the overall 
program objectives. Such policies should be clearly incorporated 
into NOAA's regulations, state management programs, and LCP's. 
In addition, they should constitute the framework for the Secre-
tary of Commerce's variance determination. There may be the ex-
, •• 32 C.F.R. § 243 (1978). 
, •• See, e.g., 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 470 & 670(f) (West Supp. 1979); 10 U.S.C.A. § 2671 (West 
Supp. 1979). 
'07 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(f) (West Supp. 1979) . 
... See Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Citizens for 
Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783 (1972); McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th 
Cir. 1971). 
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treme case where these policies are overinclusive. However, this is 
outweighed by the advantage of clear rules consistent with federal 
supremacy doctrine and the adequate protection of the national 
defense. 
These proposals would also serve to clarify the federal agencies' 
requirement to be "consistent to the maximum extent practica-
ble." It was noted above that NOAA's regulations interpret this to 
mean full consistency with the state management program except 
as prohibited by existing law applicable to the federal agency, or 
unless unforeseen circumstances arise.149 Such consistency is re-
quired for federal agency activities "directly affecting the coastal 
zone"lliO or for development projects "in the coastal zone."llil Al-
though these subsections do not mention national defense explic-
itly, the same policy considerations should apply. Otherwise sup-
porting activities for coastally dependent or excluded military 
bases could be subject to a different standard of consistency than 
the rest of the base. 
The proposals are actually compatible with a broad reading of 
the NOAA regulations.m Moreover, most potential conflicts can be 
avoided if adequate consideration is given to federal agency views 
in developing the state program.lIIS However, a more narrow read-
ing could make the standard of consistency "to the maximum ex-
tent practicable" an impractical burden on agencies responsible for 
the national defense and other vital national interests. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In its 1977 report to Congress on Coastal Zone Management, the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration recognized the 
absence of legal guidance to address matters of national signifi-
cance in the coastal zone and stated: "it is clear that uniform na-
tional guidance and financial assistance is needed before all coastal 
14' 15 C.F.R. § 930.32 (1979); see note 11 supra . 
.. 0 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(l) (West Supp. 1979). 
'" 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(2) (West Supp. 1979) . 
.. I Such compatibility is evident in the comments of Robert W. Knecht, Assistant Admin-
istrator of NOAA for Coastal Zone Management, on the drafting of the WCZMP, "[WJe will 
suggest that the WCZMP demonstrate that its policies do not arbitrarily exclude or unrea-
sonably restrict existing national security missions of the Navy and provide sufficient flex-
ibility to deal with future national security contingencies should they arise." U.S. DEP'T OP 
COMMERCE, supra note 73, at X-53 . 
.. a See, e.g., Washington State's treatment of TRIDENT Nuclear Submarine Facility, 
discussed at note 79 supra. 
.w 
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States will respond to these needs through a comprehensive coastal 
zone management."!" As this article has pointed out, this is partic-
ularly true in the area of national defense. One commentator has 
suggested that a "second coastal zone for planning and consis-
tency" be created. III Depending on the significance and location of 
the activity, consistency in this new coastal zone would be required 
whether it is a federal function or not. Close examination of the 
Coastal Zone Management Act and other applicable statutes dem-
onstrates, however, that this second coastal zone is both unneces-
sary and inconsistent with the CZMA's treatment of federal 
supremacy doctrine. 
Though somewhat ambiguous, the Coastal Zone Management 
Act provides the basis for adequate consideration of the national 
interests. What is needed is a clarification of certain policies and 
provisions that will ensure uniform implementation at the state 
and local levels. In order to avoid the potential bureaucratic 
nightmare of federal agency conflict with numerous local coastal 
programs, it is crucial that state coastal commissions take an active 
role in informing the local agencies and in ensuring that the poli-
cies are included explicitly in the local programs. Also of vital im-
portance is the "adequate consideration" of relevant federal agen-
cies' views in the development of the state and local plans. Clear 
adherence to the U.S. Attorney General's position on excluded 
lands, recognition of the coastal dependency of various federal ac-
tivities, and deference to federal agencies' views where federal 
supremacy is involved would go a long way towards insuring that 
such consideration is in fact "adequate." Such consideration does 
not imply capitulation to every desire of the federal agency, but if 
a national interest is involved the federal policy should be recog-
nized. Specifically in the area of national defense, where federal 
supremacy doctrine applies, the responsible federal agency should 
be allowed to define the national defense interest unless an abuse 
of discretion can be shown. 
The processes described in the foregoing paragraph will allow 
many minor conflicts to be ironed out in advance. State fears of 
major federal agency inconsistency should be alleviated by the in-
ternal agency policies of compliance to the maximum extent prac-
1 .. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REpORT TO THE CONGRESS ON COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT, 
PUBLIC LAW 92-583, TRANsmON QUARTER AND FISCAL YEAR 1977, at 93. . 
II. Williamson, supra note 46, at 443-53. 
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ticable, and by federal agency obligations under the intergovern-
mental coordination process. 
Greater formalization of the process by which federal agencies' 
views are considered will be a benefit to all parties concerned. Na-
tional defense and coastal zone management are much too impor-
tant issues to be subject to a Tower of Babel breakdown in com-
munication. Prompt action in adopting the proposed policies will 
help pave the way for the smooth certification of local coastal pro-
grams. Properly balancing the national defense interest in the 
coastal zone is a major step in the development and management 
of this vital part of the nation. 
